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QUESTION PRESENTED
This brief addresses the importance of the principle
of church autonomy and the protections provided
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and this
Court's precedents regarding religious denominations'
internal mandatory dispute-resolution procedures.
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INTEREST OF Al\DCP
Amicus curiae The Catholic University of America
is the national university of the Catholic Church in
the United States, founded and sponsored by the
bishops of the country with the approval of the
Holy See. Located in Washington, D.C., it has
around 3, 700 undergraduate and over 3,000 graduate
students from fifty states and eighty-six countries.
These students do course work in one or more of its
twelve schools, one of which is its School of Canon
Law. The School of Canon Law along with two other
ecclesiastical faculties (philosophy and theology) can
grant licentiate and doctorate degrees authorized by
the Holy See.
The School of Canon Law is the only school or faculty
of canon law in the United States. The School's
instruction, under the authority of the Congregation
for Catholic Education, familiarizes students with
the Catholic Church's 1983 Code of Canon Law and
its development, interpretation, and application. Its
courses prepare priests, nuns, and laypersons for the
professional practice of canon law in diocesan and
religious administration, in ecclesiastical tribunals,
and in researching and teaching canon law. Catholic
University's School of Canon Law awards two
ecclesiastical degrees: the licentiate in canon law
(J.C.L.) and doctor of canon law (J.C.D.). These
degrees prepare the students to recognize that
Catholics belong to two distinct legal systems: as
citizens, they are subject to civil (secular) law; as
1

This brief was prepared entirely by amici and their counsel.
No other person made any financial contribution to its preparation or submission. Counsel of record received timely notice of
the intent to file this brief and have consented to its filing.
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Catholics, they are subject to divine and ecclesiastical
law. The distinctions between the two systems of
law and the proper spheres of each are of great
importance.
Graduates of Catholic University's School of Canon
Law serve in a substantial percentage of the almost
200 diocesan tribunals in the United States and
also in many of the over thirty appellate tribunals
overseen by metropolitan archbishops in the United
States. Because of the experience of educating these
graduates and consulting with them regarding their
work, few Catholic institutions are better situated
to understand the critically important work of
ecclesiastical tribunals in the administration of the
Catholic Church in the United States.
The 1983 Code of Canon Law is the universal law
for the entire Latin rite of the Roman Catholic Church.
It is in force for dioceses and parishes in the United
States. It is both a theological and a juridical discipline. It has drawn from Roman law, Sacred Scripture, and the experience of a society based on faith. Its
primary purpose is to assist all members of the Church
in the proclamation of the Gospel and the salvation of
souls.
Accordingly, secular courts have neither the competence nor authority to dictate the administration or
procedure for Catholic Church diocesan or appellate
tribunals. These tribunals must adhere to procedures
certain of which have historical roots going back
centuries. Denominations must be free to oversee and
direct their own tribunals in accordance with Scripture, tradition, and learned experience. Catholic
University has joined this amicus brief to help protect
this First Amendment freedom.

3
Amicus curiae The Lutheran Church - Missouri
Synod ("The Synod"), a Missouri nonprofit corporation,
has some 6,150 member congregations with 2,200,000
baptized members throughout the United States. The
Synod steadfastly adheres to orthodox Lutheran theology and practice, and among its beliefs is the Biblical
teaching that Christians should resolve their disputes
promptly and internally without going to the secular
courts for relief (See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 6:1-8;
Matthew 5:23-24; Ephesians 4:26-27; Philippians.
2:5). The Synod has emphasized the importance of this
biblical teaching and over the years has developed
detailed procedures for the resolution of controversies
within the church. All member congregations, ordained and commissioned ministers, and certain others
listed in the Synod Bylaws are subject to mandatory
internal dispute resolution as the exclusive means of
resolving their differences with one another, with a
few exceptions. Disputes over property or contractual
rights are considered purely temporal matters falling
outside of the Synod's purview, unless such matters
involve theological, doctrinal, or ecclesiastical issues,
including those arising under the divine call of a
member of the Synod. Thus, the Synod's dispute
resolution practice is not like Petitioner's with respect
to property disputes. Nonetheless, the Synod supports
Petitioner's position because the Synod has a fervent
interest in fully protecting and maintaining the
religious freedom and liberties afforded under the
United States Constitution and re-affirmed in this
Court's recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012), which involved one of the Synod's member
congregations.

4
Amicus curiae The Queens Federation Churches,
Inc., was organized in 1931 and is an ecumenical
association of Christian churches located in the
Borough of Queens, City of New York. It is governed
by a Board of Directors composed of equal number of
clergy and lay members elected by the delegates of
member congregations at an annual assembly meeting. It relates to over 900 local churches representing
every major Christian denomination and many
independent congregations in Queens County, many of
which have internal judicial processes and would
be adversely affected by an inability to enforce
ecclesiastical judgments. The Queens Federation of
Churches has appeared as amicus curiae previously in
a variety of actions to serve the cause of justice. The
Queens Federation of Churches and its member
congregations are vitally concerned that religious
liberty be protected.

Amicus curiae The Serbian Orthodox Church in
North and South America (SOCNSA) is a geographic
region of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is
one of the fourteen autocephalous/self-governing,
hierarchical/episcopal churches which comprise the
Orthodox Christian Church, commonly referred to as
the Eastern Orthodox Church. Within the Eastern
Orthodox Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church has
the rank of Patriarchate, and its position of honor is
sixth, following the Patriarchates of Constantinople,
Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Russia. The
territory of the SOCNSA covers five Serbian Orthodox
Dioceses, each headed by its own Bishop/Hierarch
appointed by the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate: New
Gracanica-Midwestern America; Eastern America;
Western America; Canada; and South and Central
America. These dioceses together comprise over 200
parishes, 14 monasteries, a School of Theology in
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Libertyville, Illinois, and other institutions which, led
by the SOCNSA's local Episcopal/Bishop's Council,
administer the Holy Mysteries/Sacraments and
educate and minister to the over 750,000 persons of
Serbian descent who live in the Western Hemisphere
and to the other Orthodox Christians who have chosen
to accept the omophorion/jurisdiction of the Serbian
Orthodox Patriarchate.
The SOCNSA is submitting this amicus brief because the SOCNSA knows, through its own difficult
experience, recounted in this Court's landmark
decision, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for USA
and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), how
critically important it is for any church or denomination to exercise authority over those who minister in
its name, the manner by which it resolves ecclesiastical disputes and administers its own tribunals, and
the way in which it holds church property as part of
the patrimony of the church.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its particulars, this case is about a property
dispute in Michigan and the application of that state's
statute of limitations. However, it is also about the
separation of church and state-an arrangement that
is sometimes misunderstood and the details of which
are debated but which is nevertheless a critical
dimension of the religious freedom reflected in, and
protected by, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to our Constitution.
Throughout the long tradition of Western constitutionalism, the project of protecting political freedom
by marking the boundaries to the power of
government has been assisted by the principled
commitment to church-state separation, correctly

6
understood. See generally, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN,
LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). A political community that respects - as ours does - the important
distinction between the spheres of political and
religious authority is one in which the fundamental
rights of all are more secure; a government that
acknowledges this distinction and the limits to its own
reach is one that will more consistently protect and
vindicate the liberties of both individuals and
institutions. See generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett,
"The Freedom of the Church": (Toward) An Exposition,
Translation, and Defense, in MICAH SCHWARTZMAN,
CHAD FLANDERS & ZOE ROBINSON, EDS., THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2016).
The religious-freedom-protecting principle of church
-state separation has long meant, among other things,
that religious communities and institutions enjoy
meaningful autonomy and independence with respect
to their governance, structures, rituals, and teachings.
As Professor Douglas Laycock influentially put it
thirty-five years ago, "churches have a constitutionally
protected interest in managing their own institutions
free of government interference." Douglas Laycock,
Toward a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373
(1981). This autonomy has been recognized and
vindicated in a long line and wide array of this Court's
decisions and is entirely consistent with the appropriate exercise of the civil authorities' regulatory and
other powers. Indeed, this Court recently and unanimously reaffirmed as much in the landmark HosannaTabor case, which recalled the "spirit of freedom for
religious organizations, an independence from secular
control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for
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themselves, free from state interference, matters
of church government as well as those of faith
and doctrine." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 565 U.S. _ (2012), 132 S. Ct. 694, 704
(2014) (quoting Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952)).
It is precisely this "power to decide" that is
implicated in this case. The question presented by
Petitioner-"whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments require tolling of a state statute of
limitations while denomination members diligently
pursue the denomination's mandatory dispute resolution procedure," Pet. at i-goes to the implications and
demands of our constitutional commitment to the
autonomy of and the "spirit of freedom for religious
organizations." Justices Kagan and Alito, in their
concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor, observed that
"[t]o protect this crucial autonomy, we have long
recognized that the Religion Clauses protect a private
sphere within which religious bodies are free to govern
themselves in accord with their own beliefs."
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito & Kagan, JJ.,
concurring). However, religious communities are not
truly and meaningfully "free to govern themselves" if
their internal juridical and dispute-resolution procedures are not accorded reasonable respect and
deference by the secular authorities. It is important
for this Court to clarify the implications of its
church-autonomy precedents-including HosannaTabor, supra; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979);
Serbian East Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in United States
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); and Kedroff v. Saint
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Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)-for the
interaction between religious denominations' disputeresol ution and disciplinary procedures and the
application in civil litigation of statutes of limitations.

ARGUMENT
As Professor Gerard Bradley has observed, "church
autonomy"-that is, the "issue that arises when legal
principles displace religious communities' internal
rules of interpersonal relations"-is the "flagship issue
of church and state" and the "litmus test of a regime's
commitment to genuine spiritual freedom." Gerard V.
Bradley, Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy in the
Constitutional Order, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1987).
This "flagship issue" is implicated in this case and its
importance warrants this Court's review.

I. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PROTECTED
BY THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS IS ENJOYED BY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, ASSOCIATIONS,
COMMUNITIES, AND DENOMINATIONS
Petitioner Chabad-Lubavitch of Michigan is a
religious society. And, notwithstanding the confusion
sometimes on display in public debates about
"corporations" and their rights, it is well established
and beyond dispute that the constitutional right to
freedom of religion belongs not only to individuals, but
also to institutions, associations, communities, and
congregations. See generally, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor,
supra; Michael W. McConnell, Refiections on
Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'y 821, 836
(2012). Just as every person has the right to seek
religious truth and to cling to it when it is found,
religious communities have the right to hold and teach
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their own doctrines; just as every person ought to be
free from official coercion when it comes to religious
practices or professions, religious institutions are
entitled to govern themselves, and to exercise appropriate authority, free from official interference; just as
every person has the right to select the religious
teachings he will embrace, churches have the right to
select the ministers they will ordain.
Justice William Douglas observed in his dissenting
opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder that "religion is an
individual experience." 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part). It certainly is, but it
is not only that. After all, as Justice William Brennan
reminded us, "[f]or many individuals, religious activity
derives meaning in large measure from participation
in a larger religious community. Such a community
represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an
organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of
individuals." Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). These
"organic entities" are subjects, not just results or byproducts, of religious liberty. And, by virtue of and
through the exercise of their own religious-freedom
rights, religious institutions play an important
structural, checking role and provide added security to
the rights and liberties of individual persons. See
generally, Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty,
Church Autonomy, and the Structure of Freedom, in
JOHN WITTE, JR. & FRANKS. ALEXANDER, CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (2010); cf.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984) (observing that the rights of expressive associations are "especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority").
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Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to the full scope
of religious freedom protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ENCOMPASSES
THE INTERNAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES OF RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS
The principle of "separation of church and state" is,
as was noted earlier, controversial in some of its
applications, but there is a long tradition and broad
consensus in favor of institutional separation between
religious and political authority and jurisdiction. See
generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and
Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1815 (2011); Thomas C. Berg, Kimberlee Wood
Colby, Carl H. Esbeck, & Richard W. Garnett,
Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation & the
Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
175 (2011). That is, in our laws and traditions, the
institutions of the state are distinct from the
institutions of the church and neither can exercise the
functions of the other. The concept of "separation of
church and state," as it has developed and evolved in
the United States, "denote[s] a structural arrangement involving institutions, a constitutional order in
which the institutions of religion ... are distinct from,
other than, and meaningfully independent of, the
institutions of government." Richard W. Garnett,
Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like
the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. COMM. 515, 523
(2007).
Turning to the text of the First Amendment, the
"establishment" of religion that is prohibited by that
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provision refers not only to official sponsorship or
financial support but also to "active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity." Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). It is clear that
the institutional separation of church and state means
that the law may not delegate core governmental
functions to churches, see, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982), and the complementary principle is equally clear: Government may not
insert itself into controversies over the ecclesiastical
decisions of religious organizations, either by secondguessing the substance of those decisions or by interfering with the processes by which those decisions are
reached. AB this Court has long recognized, a key component of religious freedom and church-state separation is the autonomy of religious organizations over
matters of internal governance and dispute resolution.
See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1872)
(noting "unquestioned" right in America of "voluntary
religious associations" to decide "controverted questions of faith" and matters of "ecclesiastical government"); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (recognizing that the
First Amendment respects religious organizations'
"power to decide for themselves ... matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine");
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (observing that the First
Amendment does not permit civil courts to resolve
disputes involving "controversies over religious doctrine and practice"); Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1389
(2004) (noting that "the doctrine of church autonomy"
is a "recognition" that "the civil courts have no subject
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matter jurisdiction over the internal affairs of
religious organizations").
Chabad-Lubavitch of Michigan-like many other
religious institutions and societies from a wide range
of religious traditions-has, as a matter of religious
commitment and obligation, an established, mandatory, internal dispute-resolution process. AB the Court
of Appeals observed below, "[t]he parties do not
dispute that Chabad-Lubavitch religious doctrine and
polity require internal dispute resolution by means of
one of various rabbinic judicial panels or courts." Pet.
App. 6. "Permission to file a lawsuit in a civic, secular
court is required before a dispute may be taken outside
the religious organization." Ibid. Therefore, an official
rule, policy, or action that interferes with, undermines, revises, nullifies, or penalizes this disputeresolution process at least implicates Petitioner's
religious-freedom rights which are protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally,
e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 493 (2013); Douglas Laycock, Church
Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 253
(2009).
Despite this clear implication of Petitioner's
constitutional religious-freedom rights, the Michigan
Supreme Court has in effect declared, without
supporting analysis, that the Constitution of the
United States provides no basis for equitably tolling
that state's statute of limitations. Such a startling
determination warrants this Court's review.
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III. HONORING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS CAN REQUIRE EQUITABLE
TOLLING OF STATE STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS
TO ACCOMMODATE
INTERNAL
DISPUTE-RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES
Petitioner argued below that the application of the
statute of limitations-specifically, a failure to apply
equitable tolling in light of the religiously mandated
internal dispute-resolution proceedings-undermines
those proceedings, unduly and needlessly burdens the
denomination's religious-freedom rights, and therefore violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court of Appeals addressed these arguments
below; the Michigan Supreme Court, in its May 20,
2015 Order, did not. Instead, the latter court stated
without explanation that "there are no grounds on
which to equitably toll the statute of limitations" and
observed that the relevant "statutory scheme is
exclusive, and [does not] contain[] a provision to toll
the period oflimitations." Pet. App. 1-2.
However, as this Court recognized in HosannaTabor, the Constitution extends and requires "special
solicitude to the rights of religious organizations." 132
S. Ct. at 706. Just as the First Amendment requires,
in some cases, exempting religious institutions' hiring
and firing decisions from otherwise applicable nondiscrimination and employment-related statutes, it
should also be understood to require appropriate
equitable tolling of a statute of limitations in order to
permit the exhaustion of religiously mandated
internal dispute-resolution proceedings. "In a lawsuit
that strikes at the ability of the church to govern the
church, any balancing of interests between a [sincere
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secular interest or purpose], on the one hand, and
institutional religious freedom, on the other, is a
balance already struck." Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious
Organization's Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment,
13 Engage 114, 114 (2012). Indeed, as this Court put
it in Hosanna-Tabor, "the First Amendment [strikes]
the balance for us." 132 S. Ct. at 710. In order
to prevent establishment and protect free exercise,
the freedom of religious institutions will, in some
cases, prevail over even the most "worthy" goals of
government when those goals threaten to invade that
sacred sphere. Id. at 712 (Alita, J., concurring).
Because "[a]ll who unite themselves to [a religious]
body do so with an implied consent to [its] government
and are bound to submit to it ... [it] would lead to the
total subversion of religious bodies, if any one
aggrieved by one of their decisions" could have the
decision reversed by a secular court. Kedroff, 344 U.S.
at 114-15. In the same way, allowing a party to take
advantage of ecclesiastical adjudication (both by
initiating proceedings and agreeing to be bound by the
decision)-knowing that a long enough period of
nonconformity would be subject to a comprehensive
review and eventually nullified by arbitrary application of civil procedure-would lead to the subversion
of that religious autonomy which "the Religion
Clauses guarantee." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710
(Thomas, J., concurring). It is, after all, foundational
that we should "not wish a plaintiff deprived of his
rights when no policy underlying a statute of
limitations is served in doing so[.]" Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 434 (1965).
This Court has seen fit to equitably toll state
statutes of limitations when federal constitutional

15
rights are at stake. In this case, Petitioner is merely
invoking a well-established and sound principle.

CONCLUSION
To borrow from Justice Frankfurter, "what is at
stake here is the power to exercise religious
authority." Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Given the importance of the question presented, across the country and especially for
the many religious communities and institutions
whose doctrine mandates their internal dispute
mechanisms be exhausted prior to pursuing civil
remedies, this Court should grant the petition for writ
of certiorari and reverse the judgment below.
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